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THE METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF PLATO AND BERGSON
MARK C. TIMMONS
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588

Striking similarities in certain aspects of the doctrines of Plato
and Bergson support the claim that, for both, intuition is the sole
method of apprehending the ultimate object of epistemological certainty.

t t t
INTRODUCTION
One of the historically recurrent problems in philosophy
concerns the idea of the Real: What is the Real and by what
means (if any) can it be known? These fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions have assumed central
importance throughout the writings of most philosophers but
are treated with especial brilliance and novelty in the philosophies of Plato and Bergson. For Plato, knowledge of the
Real consists in the dialectical movement along the ''upward
path" from the world of appearances to the world of the
immutable, unchanging Forms. Bergson, on the other hand,
argues that the Real is pure duration, a heterogeneous, qualitative multiplicity that can be known only through an intellectual conversion whereby one gains an intuitive understanding of the Real. Although Plato and Bergson disagree as to the
nature of the Real, there is a striking resemblance in meth0dology that both men advocate. This similarity in methodology is not historically interesting, but may well serve as
a stepping stone in the unraveling of a supposed ambiguity
within the Platonic Corpus. Whereas Bergson is quite explicit
in setting forth a theory of philosophical method,Plato treats
the issue in a rather cursory manner at various places in the
Dialogues. Consequently, many interpretations have been put
forth in an attempt to render consiste!1t the various passages
throughout Plato's works. But striking similarities in certain
aspects of the doctrines of Plato and Bergson suggest an interpretation of Plato that does justice to the various relevant
passages scattered throughout the Dialogues. Thus, I shall
first make some general remarks about the methodologies
of Bergson and Plato in order to set the stage for the comparison that I hope will shed light on Plato's method. Of course,
in undertaking such a task, one must proceed in a vigilant
manner, being careful not to force the thought of one philosopher into the Procrustean Bed of another. We must, in Bergson's words, "grasp the thought of a philosopher for what it
really is" (1946:108).

I

Bergson, as is well known, distinguishes two profoundly
different ways of knowing a thing: the way of analysis and the
way of intuition. Analysis is the understanding of a thing
through what it is not. It expresses the nature of an object
in terms of other objects that are already taken to be known.
It uses universal concepts only, and, therefore, by this method
one can know of an object only by what it has in common
with other objects, never by what is unique in it. Any object
is more than a meeting place of a number of universals; but
this addition that explains the meeting of them is precisely
what conceptual methods cannot capture. Intuition, on the
other hand, is an intellectual sympathy, acquired by no little
effort, whereby one is projected into the object and identified with its being. It puts one in possession of some absolute,not as a point upon which universals are seen to converge,
but as a point from which they are seen to radiate.
Thus, it appears that analysis and intuition are directly
opposed to one another. Yet, in the life of knowledge, there
is an organic bond between the two by virtue of which the one
process pays into the other. Hence, the function of intuition can be best understood as a process complementary to
analysis. In other words, the richness and the significance of
an intuition is dependent upon the amount of analysis preceding it. An intuition gained by merely abandoning the work
of concept-forming and concept-weaving is an unintelligible
blur into which nothing has gone and from which nothing can
emerge. To take one of Bergson's examples: one may read the
adventures of a hero with a readiness of sympathy hardly to
be distinguished from an ill-balanced sentimentality, or one
may keep alert one's powers of criticism and analysis, studying
the character from different angles and, fmally, fusing those
judgments in a way that puts one in a ready disposition to
enter sympathetically into the character of the hero. The first
would be an intuition that had ignored or rejected the work
of analysis; the second, one that would have meaning because
it builds upon and supplements that undertaking.
like Bergson, Plato holds that knowledge of the absolute or Real is possible, but possible only if one is willing to
employ a particular method. The particular method that Plato
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discusses and recommends is called by him ''the dialectical
method" or "the power of conversing." Although Plato speaks
of this method in various dialogues, the precise nature of the
Dialectic is nowhere explicitly formulated. And while the
Phaedo and the Republic provide the best source of examination in an attempt to understand Plato's methodology, many
critics have found incongruities between the two texts.

has Plato determined in the Republic, in addition to the hy~
thetical method of the Phaedo, by which he thinks the dia'il
lectician can escape from the tentativeness of the Phaedo's'
procedure and reach indubitable certainty? In order to answer
this question, I want to explore the methodologies of both
Plato and Bergson, hoping that the suggestiveness of this
comparison will secure an answer.

In the Phaedo, Plato formulates a methodological
principle that would enable one, by careful use of reasoning,
to attain clear insight into the nature of all things. This "method of hypothesis," as it is called, involves the following
features: (1) It is an hypothesizing in which one adopts
opinions deliberately-he does not slide into them unconsciously; (2) It is a procedure in which one explores implications-drawing out the consequences of hypotheses-and
carefully distinguishes premises from conclusions; (3) It is a
method that consists in paying the utmost attention to the
avoidance of contradiction, in rejecting any set of opinions
that is self-contradictory; and, fmally; (4) The hypothetical
method consists in holding one's opinion provisionally, never
dogmatically.

II

The method of hypothesis, therefore, seems to suggest
a procedure of graduated approximation, whereby alterations are perpetually made in one's whole web of opinions as
contradictions are revealed among them. In this manner, the
inquiring mind renders these opinions more and more adequate. But it does not appear that they are ever rendered
fmal; the possibility that another contradiction will tum up
is always present. This method seems to provide no way of
converting the provisional into the certain.
The topic of methodology is again treated in the Republic, especially in connection with the Divided line and the
Cave. And while much of the discussion in these passages is
consistent with the hypothetical method of the Phaedo,
Plato makes an addition: he now proposes that by means of
this tentative and hypothetical attack, one may reach absolute
certainty. It is not a matter of perpetual improvement and
approximation as in the Phaedo, but of attaining incorrigible truth. Plato declares that a proper method, while recognizing hypotheses for what they are, can so manipulate them as
to reach indubitable truth or the ''unhypothesized beginning."
Thus, in the Republic, Plato advocates a passage from
hypothesis to an unhypothesized beginning by way of an
''upward path." The dialectical method alone proceeds in this
upward manner, destroying inadequate hypotheses in the
movement toward the Real. Now, while the upward path
includes the hypothetical method of the Phaedo, it does not
seem to exhaust the dialectic as Plato conceived it in the
Republic because it does not give the infallible certainty or
sure grasp of an ''unhypothesized beginning" that is emphasized in the Republic. The characteristic and new element
in the Republic is the claim to have a method that gives absolute certainty. The question to be raised here is: What method
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It should be clear from what has been said that the
philosophical methods of Plato and Bergson admit of comparison. Above, I claimed that analysis and intuition are
intimately bound up with each other, such that analysis serves
as a mental preparation for an intellectual conversion. Again,
I held that while the hypothetical method of the Phaedo is
incorporated into the dialectic, Plato argues that this latter
method can lead one to absolute knowledge of the Real,·
whereas the former cannot. Thus, for both men, the Real is
capable of being grasped intellectually by means of a special
method. In this section I want to argue that for Plato, knowledge of the Real is to be attained by intuition, a method
similar to the intellectual sympathy that Bergson repeatedly emphasizes. Thus, I shall proceed by carefully tracing
Plato's theory of dialectic, making the appropriate connections to Bergson's thought.

The upward path of the Republic includes, then, the
hypothetical method of the Phaedo, yet there seems to be an
added element. Whereas the hypothetical method only secures
tentative certainty, the dialectic arrives at absolute certainty.
It is true that in the line, Plato is pointing to a contrast of
intellectual temperaments, and that the scientific habit of
reasoning from unquestioned assumptions does differ from the
philosophical readiness and ability to extend indefmitely the
analysis of the presuppositions either of science or common
sense; but it is false that this is all he is doing. Bergson seems
to be in complete agreement with this when he discusses
the contrast between science and philosophy. Science, for
Bergson, uses symbols and proceeds by reducing objects to
elements already known. Philosophy, on the other hand, must
go beyond all concepts in order to grasp what is real. So long
as one is confmed to the realm of concepts, all knowledge is
relative. Only a transcending of this scientific framework
will yield knowledge of the absolute.
Plato seems to be arguing in a similar fashion. Science,
for Plato, utilizes the hypothetical method. In the same way
in which analysis for Bergson will never lead one to the Real,
so for Plato, science proceeds by drawing consequences from
hypotheses in an attempt to reach a more adequate hypothesis. But such a method cannot go beyond any ''hypothetical beginning": no absolute knowledge is capable of being
revealed.
It has already been noted that Bergson advocates a'
"going beyond" all conceptual analysis, a complete dispensing

with the symbols ordinarily used in everyday thought. Plato's
theory of the tine conveys a similar outlook and can be interpreted as a method for "going beyond" the methods of science
to grasp the absolute or what is unquestionable.

progressing along this series of objects graduated in brightness, one would be blinded and overcome by gazing at the sun,
not unlike the person who naively enters into the character
of the novel.

Another comparison will bring my point clearly into
focus. In the first section of this paper, I was particularly
concerned to stress the relationship between analysis and
intuition, and I argued that the appropriate amount and kind
of analysis may put one in a disposition to make the mental
effort of intuition. Similarly, in the Republic Plato seems to
be claiming that the man who competently and conscientiously practices this hypothetical method may one day find
himself in the possession of an unhypothesized beginning.
This fmal stage of cognizing the ''unhypothesized'' is not a
proof; no demonstration is made of the absolute at all. Socrates speaks in terms of "proceeding" to a beginning, but this
is not to say that one proves what is grasped absolutely.
The "beginning" at which dialectic arrives is the Form of the
Good; and Plato's view seems to be that the Good, far from
being proved, is the presupposition of all proof that is not
hypothetical. In the way in which the Real for Bergson is
known through intuition, so for Plato; it seems reasonable to
interpret him as saying essentially the same thing: Knowledge
of the Good involves an intuition, a going beyond all analysis,
a dispensing with hypotheses. Of course, for Plato, the process
of the upward path is necessary for knowledge of the Good,
though it is not sufficient.

In "Philosophical Intuition," Bergson speaks of intuition as a negative process in which one rejects a certain idea
as being simply impossible:

If my interpretation of Bergson set forth at the beginning of this paper is essentially correct, then it is clearly reasonable to make a comparison between the relationships of
analysis and intuition on the one hand, and of progression
along the upward path and knowledge of the Good on the
other. But one may question whether Plato should be held
to an ''intuition'' theory of the upward path. Perhaps I have
made use of the Procrustean Bed in my comparison of Plato
and Bergson. Yet, I think other passages throughout the
Dialogues may secure my claims concerning the dialectic
so far.
If the upward path, like analysis, does not prove or lead
one automatically to knowledge of the Real, of what use is
it? In lieu of proceeding up this challenging path, why not
begin at the beginning itself? The reason lies in what I take
Bergson to be saying concerning analysis and intuition. I
mentioned that intuition without analysis would be like someone naively sympathizing with the character of a novel where
the intellectual sympathy involved could hardly be distinguished from ill-balanced sentimentality. In a similar manner,
the prisoner released from the Cave goes through a series of
objects graduated in brightness before he can look at the sun.
This series of preliminary objects does not demonstrate the
sun, but only enables him to see it. The prisoner gradually
strenghtens his eyes. Just so, the dialectician on the upward
path is gradually strengthening his mental vision until he
can fully comprehend the existence of each stage. Without

What a strange force this intuitive power of
negation is! . . . Is it not obvious that the first
step the philosopher takes when his thought is
still faltering and there is nothing definite in his
doctrine, is to reject certain things defmitely?
Later he will make changes in much of what he
affirms, but he will vary only slightly in what he
believes (1946: 105).
Again, it seems that this negative aspect of intuition
parallels one's progression up the tine. At each successive
stage of the line, one is greatly inclined to accept the appearances and take them to be Real. But it is the whispering of
the word "Impossible!" into the philosopher's ear that compels him to reject as Real what each stage offers, "even though
the facts and reasons appeared to invite you to think it possible and real and certain" (1946:110). Thus, as one moves
up the tine, the hypotheses that present themselves are
continually being altered and refined, rejected for what is
more adequate.
Let us tum now to other Dialogues for support of my
interpretation, which at this point may seem to rest on tenuous evidence. In the Symposium, Plato gives an account of
the lover's progress to the Beautiful. Although the Beautiful
is known through itself, a long apprenticeship among the many
beautifuls is necessary before this direct knowledge can
occur. A similar view is implied in the Seventh Letter. Plato
says that:
It cannot be expressed like other learning,
but after community of life with much discussion
of the matter itself, it suddenly appears in the
soul like light kindling from leaping fire, and
thenceforth sustains itself (341 c).

This is perhaps the clearest passage that lends credibility to my claims. Here, Plato, like Bergson, is saying that
knowledge of what is Real is not to be gained in the way one
approaches the sciences. Rather, one must go beyond all
science and its methods to gain an intuition whereby the
Real "suddenly appears in the soul." This "suddenness"
suggests an immediacy, a dispensing with one's ordinary manner of symbolism, and an "entering into" or sympathizing
intellectually with the Absolute.
Both in the Republic and the Seventh Letter, Plato
seems to attribute the same quality of ineffability to one's
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apprehension of the Good that can be found in Bergson's
claims concerning the intuition of duration. For Bergson,
one's experience of pure duration is essentially incommunicable!
. . . that which constitutes his [the character's] essence cannot be perceived from without,
being internal by definition, nor be expressed in
symbols, being incommensurate with everything
else (1946:108).
In Plato this same inexpressability of one's intuition of
the Real is mentioned in the Republic. When Glaucon asks
Socrates to tell him what the Good is, Socrates replies:
I am afraid it is beyond my powers; with the
best will in the world I should only disgrace myself and be laughed at (506E).
Again in the Seventh Letter Plato, in talking about
knowledge of the Good, writes:
But when it is "the fifth" about which we
are compelled to answer questions or to make
explanations, then anyone who wishes to refute
us has the advantage and can make the propounder
of a doctrine, whether in writing or speaking or
in answering questions, seem to most of his
listeners completely ignorant. . . . Those who
listen sometimes do not realize that it is not the
mind of the speaker or writer which is being refuted, but these four instruments mentioned.
(343E).
The reservations that Plato expresses in both passages
concerning the communicating of the Good stems from the
fact that since the knowledge to be gained of the Good is inexpressible, any attempt to convey such knowledge is hopelessly obscure, if not silly.

In talking of "intuition," Bergson describes this experience as an "entering into" the object in order to understand what is unique in it. I think Plato has a similar point
in mind in his repeated assertion that there must be a kinship
between the mind of the enquirer and the ultimate objects
of philosophical study. For example, in the Seventh Letter,
Plato says:
In short, neither quickness of learning nor
a good memory can make a man see when his
nature is not akin to the object (344A).
Both men appear to be saying that intuition involves
an immediacy that no amount of analysis or scientific
research or method of demonstration can attain.
There is a fmal comparison I want to sketch con150

cerning Plato's conception of the downward path and Bergson's notion of moving from intuition to analysis. In ''Philosophical Intuition ," Bergson claims that as one seeks to pene.
trate more fully into a philosopher's thought instead of
"moving around its exterior," his doctrines are transformed
for us. In other words, by grasping what is essential to the
thought of another via intuition, the whole of his thOUght
is brought together "into a single point." The various as·
pects fit neatly together as the multifarious facets of the
philosophy appear with new clarity and freshness. This is
an example of a movement from intuition to analysis. A simi·
lar concept is to be found in the downward path that moves
from one's grasping of the Good to the various lesser levels.
Having knowledge of the Good, one possesses for the first
time categorical, demonstrative knowledge. The downward
path distinguishes the true from false hypotheses of the upward in a process that includes assimilating what is true and
approaching it from an indubitable, unhypothesized stand·
point.
To conclude, there are, no doubt, many more comparisons to be made here, but they will be left untreated in this
paper. Of course, the reader should not be persuaded that
everything that Plato and Bergson say on this issue coincide
perfectly. My purpose is to elucidate those points of coincidence that I think useful in coming to a correct interpretation
of Plato's dialectic.
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